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 The study compares military interventions in Turkey and Israel and examine how civil-
military relations evolved since state formation. The term "arbitrator army" has been used to 
describe militaries that determine the political outcomes in the societies they serve. Both Turkey 
and Israel have democratic systems. Both states have institutional and legal frameworks that 
stipulate the supremacy of the political leadership over the military, yet in both states the militaries 
intervene in politics and exert influence. The main purpose of study to explain how strong military 
influence in political issues has resulted in direct military interventions in Turkey but not in 
Israel. Through a historical comparison, this study examines how the civilian leadership has shared 
power with the military and what explains the breakdown of their partnership between the civilian 
and the military leadership. This study argues that the political institutions established during state 
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 The purpose of this thesis is to compare civil-military relations in Turkey and Israel, 
focusing on the military’s intervention in politics, rather than civilian intervention in the military. 
Noting that civil-military relations encompass a variety of interactions between the military and 
the political institutions such as the parliament, judiciary, government, and political parties, it is 
shown that the military in Israel and Turkey exerts considerable influence in political and civilian 
affairs. The role of the military in these countries does not conform to the normative civil-military 
dynamics in democracies, whereby the subordination of the armed forces to the civilian authorities 
of the state is observed. The purpose of this thesis is to compare the civil-military relations in 
Turkey and Israel to understand the different types and level of the military’s intervention in 
politics. 
 
 Perlmutter (1981, 25) uses the terms "arbitrator army" to describe militaries that intervene 
to uphold the existing political order and resolve constitutional stalemates but remain interested in 
military issues, withdrawing once disputes are settled. It may also be the case that the civilian 
leadership requires the support of the military to secure its position, and therefore accommodates 
the demands of the military. Kamrava (2000, 69-70) cites Israel and Turkey as “military 
democracies,” due to the role of the military as an arbitrator of political outcomes. Both states have 
representative institutions and electoral systems through which citizens vote for political parties. 
Both countries possess institutional frameworks that stipulate the supremacy of the political 
leadership over the military. Though in Israel and Turkey the subordination of the military is 
guaranteed through laws, pervasive military influence is also constitutionally regulated. 
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 In a democratic regime in which the military is granted a constitutionally sanctioned 
independent role to act as the guardian, it is obvious that the democracy is under some form of 
military tutelage. The military controls other state agencies of the security apparatus, such as the 
police and intelligence and exercises civilian oversight over the democratically-elected civilian 
authorities. Consequently, the threat of a coup d’état limits the authority and scope of action of the 
democratically elected civilian government (Kuru 2012, 46).  The degree to which the military 
participates directly or indirectly in domestic politics may vary. For issues that do not involve 
defense and security concerns, the military is likely to seek support by forming coalitions with 
civilian groups. In such regimes, the militaries may not govern directly, but are highly politicized 
(Cook 2007; Fitch 1998).  
 
 Article 35 of the Internal Service Law (ISL) of 1935 granted the Turkish Armed Forces 
(TAF, Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri TSK) its “guardianship” role, making the Turkish army responsible 
for protecting the Turkish homeland and guarding the Republic of Turkey as defined in the 
Constitution.1 According to this provision, the TAF have intervened directly four times following 
periods of political instability, displacing the civilian government (in 1971 and 1997) and assuming 
direct military rule (in 1960 and 1980). The three instances of direct military rule have been brief- 
1960-1961, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983. The 1997 “post-modern coup” which resulted in the 
dissolution of the coalition government and the political ban of the Welfare Party (RP, Refah 
Partisi), was the military’s campaign to alert the public to the threat the Islamist political parties 
posed to the secular political order (Cook 2007, 124-5). In 2007, the e-memorandum published on 
                                                 
1 This translation of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service law is my translation from the the wording 
repeated in the version of the law passed in 1961: Türk Silahli Iç Hizmetler Kanunu No. 211, January 4, 
1961, Article 35. (from http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/211.14.text.asp) 
3 
the website of the General Staff, warning of military action to protect secularism should the 
government insist on Abdullah Gül’s candidacy in the parliamentary elections, resulted in the 
Justice and Development Party’s (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) victory.  
 
 The coup threat seemed no longer credible and the military’s prestige further eroded as in 
2008 many retired and active high-ranking commanders were tried under allegations of being 
involved in the Ergenekon case (Gürsoy 2012, 194) for planning military coups to overthrow the 
AKP-led government. In 2013 article 35 was amended, fundamentally altering the military’s core 
identity as the guardian of the of the Turkish Republic, by removing the legal and moral 
justification to intervene in domestic politics. The mission of the TAF was redefined as defense 
against external enemies and its actions brought under the control of the parliament.2 The official 
narrative of the failed military coup on 15 July 2016, is that it was instigated by the Gülen 
Organization (GO), aiming to overthrow the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). The AKP and GO had previously been allied against the 
military-bureaucratic secular establishment in Turkey, until corruption investigations against AKP 
members in 2013 caused a split (Yilmaz and Bashirov, 2018, 7). The service law was amended in 
2013 and the phrase, “to protect and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic” 
 
                                                 
2 The wording in the current version of the law passed in 2013: “The mission of the Armed Forces is to 
defend Turkish territory against the foreign-borne threats and dangers; to ensure that the military strength 
is maintained and strengthened to ensure deterrence; to carry out the missions abroad assigned by the 
decision of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and to assist in ensuring international peace.” "Turkish 
Armed Forces". 2013. Tsk.Tr. https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=Mission.  
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 The analysis of the influence of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF, Tzva ha Hagana Le-
Yisrael, Tzahal) in politics is more challenging, as the guardianship role of the military is not 
constitutionally sanctioned, therefore the assumption of a military tutelage is not as straightforward 
as in Turkey. The high level of external threats allowed the IDF to exert significant influence in 
decision-making but neither has it transform the country into a “garrison state” ruled by military 
authorities (cf. Lasswell 1941), nor has there been any military coup attempted. Compared to other 
democracies, the military’s influence is significant, and the electorate generally accepts that 
military officers have always played an important role in shaping the political decision (Kamrava 
2000, 71). Settlement policy was a security issue, and therefore the IDF was directly involved. The 
IDF’s role in the administration of the settlements had been important during the state-building 
process, but it also had the effect of expanding its political role. Peri (1981, 310) argues that there 
was no clear constitutional basis that subordinated the military to civilian authority. The 
administration of the settlements by military governors who represent the Ministry of Defense but 
are also responsible to the Chief of Staff’s senior adviser in issues of the occupied territories 
became part of the power struggle between the civilian and military leaderships and the 
implementation of security policies was further complicated by partisanship issues (Peri 1981, 
309). However, the IDF’s involvement in administrating the settlements had the effect of 
expanding the role of the military in society, legitimizing its indirect military interventions in 
politics (Ben-Eliezer 1995, 272).  Post-retirement, military officers have served as Prime Minister, 
Defense Minister and taken other key government posts, able to capitalize of the formation of close 
relations with Israeli society.  
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 The permeability between the civilian and military leadership is partly also reflected in the 
Basic Laws. In Israel, section 3b of the 1976 Basic Law stipulates that the army is “subject to 
government authority and subordinate to the minister of defense”, yet in section 3c, “the chief of 
the general staff is appointed by the government upon the recommendation of the minister of 
defense.”3 The roles and responsibilities of the political and military leaderships are not clearly 
delineated, as the wording in the current version of the law passed in 1976 implies that the 
appointment of the CGS establishes also a parallel line of responsibility to the Prime Minister and 
creates the conditions for a power struggle between the CGS and the Defense Minister (Ben-Meir 
1995, 31).  Peri (1983, 131) argues that the opinion of the CGS is decisive in the promotions and 
the appointment of the high-ranking generals, as  the recommendations by the CGS are always 
approved by the Defense Minister, but as there is no formal written procedure, any decision 
depends on the relations between the CGS and the Defense Minister. Thus, promotions and 
appointments of the senior officers have been an issue over which the military has struggled to 
maintain institutional autonomy and political elites have struggled to protect their authorities. 
 
 A military coup d’état usually refers to military rule as a result from military coercion 
for government changes. Military influence and coercion in politics does not always result in direct 
military rule, but in the displacement of the existing civilian leadership and the installation of a 
new civilian government supported by the military. The term ‘direct military intervention’ will be 
used to describe both military takeovers that result in direct military rule and the displacement of 
a civilian government by another civilian government, as it facilitates the comparison of the type 
of the military’s intervention in Israel and Turkey.  
                                                 
3 2003. Knesset.Gov.Il. https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic11_eng.htm.  
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Israel and Turkey have two of the strongest armies in the Middle East that are considered important 
political actors that have contributed to the state-building process. The discussion in the following 
chapters does not focus as much on why the militaries in Israel and Turkey have come to possess 
strong political roles but seeks explanations for the different manifestations of that pervasive 
military influence. The main purpose of that this thesis is to explain how strong military influence 
in political issues has resulted in direct military interventions in Turkey but not in Israel.  
 
 Turkey and Israel have certain similarities accounting for different types and levels of 
military intervention in politics. Both armies defended the independence of their countries and 
became major actors during the state-building process. The TAF inherited traditions from the 
Ottoman army, and IDF from the Haganah, the military underground of the Jewish community 
during the British Mandate in Palestine. The founding leaders, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey 
and David Ben-Gurion in Israel, exerted strong civilian control over the military leadership on 
civil-military relations ensuring military subordination to the civilian leadership. Both Israel and 
Turkey have multi-party systems and political institutions that allow meaningful input from the 
electorates (Kamrava, 2000). 
 
 To account for differences in the consolidation of democracy in Israel and Turkey, this 
study focuses on the military’s participation in politics during the state-building period. The single-
party era in Turkey (1923-1946) was formative in establishing the role of the military as the 
protector of the state, but most importantly of the regime. The party created by Kemal Mustafa 
Atatürk, the Republican People's Party (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) was based on a coalition 
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of military and civil bureaucrats, which also founded the Turkish Republic. Protection of the 
regime became synonymous to state unity and survival, and opposition parties were outlawed 
within months of their formation.  
 
 During the single-party period civilian supremacy was established over the military, as 
civilian leaders had close personal ties to military leadership and the army was the spearhead of 
economic and political reforms (Harris, 1965). Transition to a multi-party electoral system proved 
problematic, as coalition governments attempted to marginalize the political role of the military. 
Repeated clashes between civilian and military authorities resulted in the military trying to 
consolidate its protector status after each direct intervention, and the civilian leaders increasingly 
accommodating demands of political groups that the Kemalist elite would not tolerate in a 
government coalition (Cook 2007, 126-127). 
 
 The military in Israel emerged from the consolidation of the military underground 
organizations of the Jewish community in the British Mandate of Palestine, the Haganah, the Irgun 
and the Lehi, into the IDF, and solidified its role as state protector through victories in the 
battlefields that achieved independence (Yariv 1985, 108). The military branches of the Lehi and 
Irgun organizations were dissolved under the leadership of Haganah in the IDF and competition 
migrated to the political party system. The Labor movement (Mapai, Workers’ Party of the Land 
of Israel) was voted out of power for the first time in 1977. Unlike Turkey, the military and civilian 
leadership did not adhere to a single political ideology, nor did the military seek to impose any 
institutional ideology on the civilian leadership. The military instead imported ideologies 
developed in the civilian sphere, an indication of the military’s subordination to the state and 
acceptance of the legitimacy of civilian authorities.  
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 This thesis argues that the role of the military in the early state-building period determined 
future military influence in domestic politics. In Israel and Turkey perception of security threats 
necessitated the participation of military officers in politics. In both cases there have been 
ambiguities in the basic law defining the responsibilities of civilian and military actors, which are 
limited as the military overall adheres to the principle of civilian control (Yariv 1985,110). Both 
the TAF and the IDF were considered the strongest institutions during the state-building period 
(Fisher 1963; Halpern 1963) that could carry out reforms and promote economic development. 
During the Single-Party era in Turkey (1923-1946), the Kemalist coalition between military 
officers and state bureaucrats abolished opposition parties that challenged Kemalist ideology. The 
transition to multiparty politics and the ascendance of parties that sought to marginalize the 
Kemalists prompted military intervention to secure the military’s political role and uphold the 
founding principles of the state. Despite the interventions, observably, the balance of power has 
shifted in favor of the civilian leadership. During the Labor Party’s political hegemony in Israel, 
the competition between the ideologically diverse military underground organizations was 
transferred to the multi-party system. In Israel, political disputes between the civilian and military 
elites have been settled through political institutions as officers have access to government through 
political parties. In sum, democratic culture in Israel is more consolidated. In the following section, 
an overview of the literature on the sub-field of civil-military relations, as well as on civil-military 




2. Literature Review 
 The main trends that dominate literature on civil-military relations were set in the 1950s 
and 1960s and scholars have ever since been compelled to engage with Huntington (1957) and 
Janowitz's (1964) interpretations of the relationship between military professionalism and civilian 
control. Modernization approaches on militaries in the developing world (Halpern 1963; Fisher 
1963; Shils 1966) were overall dismissive of the notion that military professionalism would 
enhance civilian control by depoliticizing the armed forces. In the developing world the military 
institution was the only actor that could introduce political change. Professionalism could increase 
the institutional autonomy and internal cohesion of the military by constructing a sense of 
corporate identity and encourage military intervention (Abrahamson 1972; Finer 1962; Nordlinger 
1976; Perlmutter 1977). Corporate interests also dictated military withdrawal in South America 
and Southern Europe in the 1980s and facilitated transition to democracy  
 
 Technological developments in warfare necessitated  increased interaction between the 
civilian and the military sector, yet scholars are divided as to whether civil-military convergence 
will result in the civilianization of the military (Ginsburgh 1964; Lang 1973a, 197 b; Zuckerman 
1962) or the militarization of the civilians (Ben-Eliezer 1995; Laswell 1962; Perlmutter 1968). 
Segal et al. (1974) maintained that high levels of convergence between the civilian and the military 
sector would instead decrease interaction.  
 
 Concordance theory attempted to displace the hypothesis that maintained the separation of 
the civil and military spheres is essential to civilian control, proposing instead a partnership model 
between the political and military leadership (Schiff, 1995; Narli 2000). Organizational unity and 
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internal cohesion remained the measure that determined military propensity to intervene (Brooks 
2008; Feaver 1999; Lee 2005; O’Donnell 1986) and became the object of target by civilian 
leadership to marginalize the political power of the military and prevent military takeovers (Belkin 
& Schofer 2003; Brooks 2013; De Bruin 2018; Powell 2012, Quinlivin 1999). In the following 
chapter the review of the literature is mainly presented chronologically, in an effort to trace the 
emergence and development of trends in academic research. 
 
 2.1 Modernization Theory 
 Questions of why militaries intervene in politics and what factors explain the military coup 
d’état phenomenon are not new to the scholarly literature. The predominant role of the military in 
the post-World War II decolonization and national independence movements in the developing 
world inspired a first wave of research and publications in the 1960s and 1970s. The militaries in 
the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia had been the recipient of European powers’ training 
and monetary assistance (Johnson 1963, Thompson 1974a, 1974b) and already exerted 
considerable influence in the government (Fisher 1963; Rostow 1963). Representative institutions 
were often externally imposed, so the military was viewed as a sufficiently modernized force that 
retained a hierarchical structure and respect for tradition with which societies unfamiliar with the 
notion of civic or political participation could identify (Halpern 1963, 288; Shils 1962, 31). As the 
strongest institution at the birth of a new nation, the army served as a citizenship identifier and 
through the process of acculturation facilitated the creation of national and political awareness 
(Halpern 1963, 291; Pye 1962, 83). Simply put, in developing countries the military not only 
spearheaded economic reforms but could also potentially set the foundations for the creation of 
political institutions (Halpern 1963; Pauker 1959; Pye 1962; Shils 1962).  
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 2.2 Military Professionalism  
 The patterns of interaction between civil and military institutions in newly independent 
states observed in that first wave of scholarship contradicted the dichotomy that Samuel 
Huntington had identified in the 1950s as a distinctive feature of civil-military relations in Western 
democracies in the seminal work the Soldier & the State. Huntington (1957) examines the 
institution of the military in Western liberal democracies and argues that professionalization and 
subsequent de-politicization of the military is required to establish and maintain objective civilian 
control. Civilian control over the military can be subjective, which is described as the 
“minimization of military power through the maximization of civilian power” or objective, 
described as “militarizing the military and making it the tool of the state” (Huntington 1957, 80-
3). Objective control is achieved by “maximizing military professionalism,” which would 
eventually reduce the influence of the military in politics, allowing it to focus on security related 
issues while subordinated to civilian authorities. Subjective control occurs in totalitarian systems 
whereby the civilian leadership’s propensity to intervene in the military engenders the 
politicization of the army, binding the interests of the officers to those of the civilian regime 
Huntington (1957, 80-3). 
 
 Morris Janowitz (1964, 234) rejected the thesis that depoliticization of the army can be 
achieved through labor division and professionalization, arguing that what can be identified and 
should be desired as “partisan neutrality” in the officer corps should not mean that officers are 
politically neutral as well. Other scholars also argued that an increase in the security expertise of 
military officers does not assure their de-politicization (Abrahamson 1972; Welch and Smith 
1974). Examining developing states, Janowitz (1964, 27-9) argued that the organizational structure 
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of the military allowed it to maintain control over the ‘instruments of violence’ and therefore 
enabled it to intervene in politics more readily than civilians. High internal cohesion and 
organizational unity increased the likelihood of military intervention (Janowitz 1977, 105; Welch 
and Smith 1974, 14). Huntington (1957, 2) argues that civilian control of the military is a function 
of the domestic institutions of a state and its security imperatives. Consequently, the development 
and maintenance of high standards of military professionalism within the officer corps depends 
not only upon threats to the state’s security, but also on its political and social institutions 
(Huntington 1977, 7). For Huntington, any political system that enforces the ideology of the 
civilian regime on the military is in “the state of a latent crisis” (Ibid). Welch and Smith (1974, 3) 
also argued that domestic civilian institutions that can channel political participation affect the 
military’s propensity to intervene in politics. 
 
 The military professionalism hypothesis remained influential in scholarly research on civil-
military relations throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The “objective civilian control” model put forth 
by Huntington could endanger civilian control (Finer 1962, 23-30), as increased professionalism 
of the military might encourage and facilitate intervention when the officers were disenchanted by 
government politics. Finer (1962, 30) argued that “the firm acceptance of civil supremacy” ensured 
military subordination to political leadership. Welch and Smith (1974, 18) further argued that 
technological advances and high standards of professionalism would lead to greater autonomy of 
the military and reinforce any political ambitions.  
 
 Subjective civilian control over the military was effectively achieved through political 
indoctrination (Van Doorn 1969) rather than coercion (Huntington 1957, 80-3). Van Doorn (1969, 
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20) argues that in the subjective civilian control model, politicization of the armed forces does not 
inhibit the development of military professionalism but enables the civilian regime to control it. 
Other scholars argue that professionalism and autonomy in the military could enhance 
politicization, as the boundaries between the military and political spheres become permeable 
(Abrahamson 1972; Perlmutter 1977). Larson (1973, 65-6) argued that the major problem in the 
military professionalism thesis is that while many of the characteristics of professionalism such as 
organization, extensive education, a code of ethics and enforcement mechanisms, social 
responsibility and sense of community are present in the officer corps, autonomy is absent. As any 
decisions regarding recruitment, education, performance and other professional matters are made 
by civilians or taken under external civilian control, the military lacks real autonomy (Smith 1966, 
202).  
 
 2.3 Bureaucratization 
 The professionalism thesis based primarily on military expertise emphasized civil-military 
differences but did not capture the non-conflictual nature of relationships between civilian and 
military leaderships. Janowitz (1965) observed changes in the technology of warfare due to the 
increasing convergence of military and civilian skill requirements. Zuckerman (1962, 254) argued 
that the more technology a weapons system contains, the more likely it is to have been the result 
of civilian rather than military thinking. Ginsburg (1964, 257-9) projected that the arms race would 
force the military to depend heavily on civilian sectors in order to pursue their professions and 
gradually erode the military’s authority over its affairs.  
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Lang (1973) claimed that the logistic requirements of modern weapons necessitated coordination 
among civilian and military sectors, noting that joint activities increased the exposure of the 
military to civilian organizational structures. Cooperation with the civilian sector compelled the 
military to adopt civilian structures to project the image of professionalism as other institutional 
sectors (Lang 1973, 16). Diversification of the occupational structure as the demand of civilian 
skills requirement increased would result in its bureaucratization, a trend that Lang identifies 
toward civilianization (Ibid 17).  Professionalism was therefore the result of the civilianization of 
the military as it is forced to rely more on the civilian sector (Lang 1973; Zuckerman 1962). 
Janowitz (1971, 21) maintained that "the narrowing distinction between military and nonmilitary 
bureaucracies can never result in the elimination of fundamental organizational differences”.  
 
 2.4 Civil-Military Convergence 
 Civil-military convergence might be the outcome of civilian input in technological 
developments in the military, and positions that the equilibrium could favor either side were 
developed. Scholars identified the convergence between the civilian and the military as the 
civilianization of the military institutions (Lang 1973, 16-7; Biderman and Sharp, 1968,397). 
Laswell’s (1962) advanced his original ‘garrison state’ hypothesis whereby the soldiers as 
“specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society” (1941, 455) and argued that the 
development of new technologies in warfare meant that the risk of being a civilian in wartime was 
almost the same as that of being a soldier. Technological development would result in the 
dominance of the military in any merged civilian and military social structure (Laswell 1962).  
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 Segal et al (1974, 159) proposed a conceptual distinction between structural convergence 
of the civilian and military institution and interdependence between the institutions, arguing that 
a military with an organizational structure similar to that of the civilian sector organizational 
structure of the civilian society reduces its reliance on the civilian sector. Structural convergence 
does not result in increased permeability between the civil and military sector; reliance on the 
civilian sector and interdependence occur as long as there is difference between the organizational 
and occupational structures (Segal et al. 1974, 168-9). Thus, high levels of civil-military structural 
convergence should be followed by low levels of interaction; Israel is an exception to this model 
(Segal et al. 1974). 
 
 2.5 Corporate Grievances 
 Approaches emphasizing the failure of political institutions as determinants of the 
military’s propensity to stage coups (Huntington, 1968) fell out of favor in the late 1970s and were 
largely supplanted by the renewed corporate grievances hypothesis (Needler, 1975; Nordlinger 
1976; Perlmutter 1977). Finer (1962, 31) had already argued that a military’s disposition to 
intervene in politics is influenced by the military’s perception of the national interest, corporate 
self-interest, social self-interest and individual self-interest. More than often national interest 
served as a justification to advance the corporate or self-interest of the military, as preservation of 
autonomy is identified as the major motivation for military interventions (Finer 1962, 41). The 
objective conditions taken into account before a military intervention are referred to as 
opportunities to intervene and include domestic circumstances, the military’s popularity as well as 
the military’s reliance on the civilian sector (Ibid 63).  
 
16 
 Needler (1975, 71) argues that militaries are more prone to intervene on behalf of the 
national interest when convinced that non-intervention is a threat to the institution of the military, 
that is when their corporate interest is at stake. Nordlinger (1976, 78) argues that “the great 
majority of coups are partly, primarily, or entirely motivated by the defense or enhancement of the 
military’s corporate interests.” Military corporatism is defined as the protection and advancement 
of the military’s own interest, and the military aims to control its internal affairs and budget by 
preventing civilian institutions from gaining control and amass responsibilities that ensure the 
continuation of the institution (Ibid 65). Nordlinger (1976, 64) considers the loss of a civilian 
government’s legitimacy as a pretext for military intervention, as it offers justification to further 
the military’s corporate interests and individual ambitions of the officers.  Nordlinger (1976, 78) 
claims that corporate interests are more frequently jeopardized by civilian governments, 
suggesting that once a government controlled by the coup makes is installed, its primary aim would 
be to protect and advance military interests. This view fails to consider that military coups are 
often the product of broader coalitions with civilian groups that increase the officers’ reliance on 
non-military politicians and bureaucrats postcoup, making the advancement of any corporate 
interests inherently difficult.  
 
 Perlmutter (1977, xiv) assumes a similarly uniform view of the military’s corporate 
interests and advances Needler’s and Nordlinger’s argument, claiming that corporativism and not 
professionalism determines a military’s propensity to intervene in politics. As in Van Doorn’s 
(1969) assessment of the subjective civilian control model whereby politicization is not a 
perversion but rather the rule that underscore military professionalism, Perlmutter (1977, 312-3) 
does not view military professionalism as incompatible with corporatism, but maintains that 
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professionalism, which is defined as “the  acquisition and manipulation of skill,” will produce an 
occupational orientation in the military, the degree to which it’s committed will influence any 
decision to intervene in politics. Jencks (1982, 12-3) points out that Perlmutter’s (1977, 312-3) 
definition of professionalism is in fact expertise, which would explain why he views the military 
as a group possessing highly specialized skills that seeks to maintain professional autonomy. 
 
 Huntington (1977, 7) argued that the political orientation of the society determined both 
the military’s ability to maintain high standards of professionalism and its disinclination to 
intervene. For Huntington that outcome was best achieved should the society demonstrate pro-
military conservativism. Perlmutter (1969, 205) identified the “revolutionary” soldier as a 
professional or expert officer that lacked corporativist inclinations to intervene, unlike the other 
types of modern officers in his classification, the “classical professional” and the “praetorian.” 
Perlmutter (Ibid 35-7) argues that the Israeli army officers are considered “revolutionary,” as the 
professional army demonstrated ideological commitment to the party doctrine which emphasized 
the notion of the people’s army.  
 
 Derived from the corporate grievance hypothesis but diverging from Nordlinger’s (1976) 
military corporatism theory, academic research during the 1980s and early 1990s largely focused 
on the successful democratic transitions occurring throughout Southern Europe and Latin America. 
Scholars argued that the civilian elites and armed forces deemed the continuation of authoritarian 
rule harmful to their respective corporate interests (Fitch 1998; Heper 1985, 1991; Heper and 
Güney 1996; Hunter 1995, 1998; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Pion-Berlin 1992, Ruhl 1996).  
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Military rule in South America had produced a series of failed policies and corrupt practices that 
no longer served the purpose of the military institutions themselves. As a result, many officers 
rejected the guardian role of the military and preferred to dissociate themselves from authoritarian 
legacies, avoiding coup behavior (Fitch 1998). Pion-Berlin (1992, 82) argues that the pursuit of 
individual and corporate ambitions resulted in military failures that produced an identity crisis 
among the officer corps.  
 
 The erosion of military stature in countries like Argentina, Peru and Uruguay facilitated 
democratic transition and compromise with civilian politicians (O’Donnell et al. 1986, 18-20). 
Heper (1991, 16-20) argues that in Turkey, the military had acted “without any allies in civil 
society,” and that interventions initiated by the Kemalist military and bureaucratic elite aimed to 
consolidate their corporate interests (Heper 1985, 87-8). Transition to civilian rule in the 1980s 
was facilitated by the coup leaders’ decision not to obstruct competitive elections, even if the 
victory of Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party challenged the political order the military intervened in 
order to defend (Heper and Güney 1996, 630). 
 
 2.6. Israel: Civil-military Convergence  
 The resurgence of the convergence theory in literature largely aimed to explain civil-
military relations in Israel (Ben-Eliezer 1995, 1997, 1998; Etzioni-Halevy 1996; Horowitz 1982; 
Kamrava 2000; Lissak 1998; Peri 1981, 1983). Kamrava’s (2000, 70-3) approach is indicative of 
the trend, as he cites Israel and Turkey as “military democracies,” whereby militaries with strong 
corporate identities and pervasive influence in politics assumed the role of integrating the societies 
they served.  Horowitz (1982, 77) rejected Laswell’s (1962) ‘garrison state’ hypothesis in favor of 
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a “civilianized military in a partially militarized society,” identifying the multiparty system 
principles as a major factor that affected the civilianization of the IDF. Perlmutter (1968, 643) had 
earlier argued that the army’s dependence upon the reserve system militarized the society through 
the integration of veterans into civilian roles. Horowitz (1982, 77) suggested that the large number 
of civilian reservists in Israel introduced civilian values into the military and ensured the 
subordination of soldiers to civilian structures.  
 
 Lissak (1998) argued the partial militarization of society did not reduce civilian control of 
the military. Ben-Eliezer (1995; 1997; 1998) advanced Laswell’s (1962) argument on threats that 
increasingly target civilian and soldiers alike. Any partially militarized society would eventually 
become fully militaristic, as military affairs and war threat becomes the concern of the citizens. 
The term ‘cultural militarism’ is used to describe a society for which “war is a central, desirable, 
effective, legitimate and necessary solution to the political problems that vitiate relations between 
states or nations” (Ben-Eliezer 1998, 319). That being said, IDF’s “inordinate influence” on 
political decisions, as it determines military doctrines, has never constituted a “praetorian” threat 
against civilian leadership (Ben-Eliezer 1997, 9). Peri (1983a, 86) describes the relations between 
the civil and military establishment as that of a political-military “partnership” that displays 
patterns of convergence and divergence. The acquisition of direct political roles in the 
administration of the occupied territories by the military leaders increased the direction of 
convergence toward militarization (Peri 1981, 303-4). Etzioni-Halevy (1996) also argues that the 
practice of military officers being catapulted into politics after retirement may benefit 
communication and coordination between civilian and military leaderships and facilitate 
convergence but does not detract from the democratic quality. In our discussion of the earlier 
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theoretical approaches on civil-military convergence, scholars expected that high levels of civil-
military structural convergence would limit interaction of the civilian and the military sector, as it 
would reduce the military’s dependence on the civilian sector. The persistence of high levels of 
interaction despite structural convergence would suggest that Israel at that time remained an 
exception to the model proposed by Segal et al. (1974). 
 
 2.7 Threat Environment 
 Scholars in the 1980s and 1990s renewed their interest on the effect of internal and external 
threats on civil-military relations, re-examining Huntington’s (1957, 2) argument that internal and 
external security imperatives determined the level of civilian control of the military. Horowitz 
(1982, 77) claims that civil-military relations in Israel are unique case, due to external threat to its 
security stemming from the multiple and protracted conflicts with Arab states.  
 
 Desch (1999) argues that threat perceptions are major determinants of military 
interventions, finding that external and internal threats to the state produce different outcomes in 
civil-military relations. External threats target the state and the citizens, levelling divisions 
between the military and the civilian, and uniting against the common external danger (Desch 
1999, 12-3). Internal threats, depending on the source may result in the direct intervention of the 
military, either to support the regime, or to install a different civilian or military leadership (Ibid).  
Strong civilian control of the military is observed when the state perceives high external and low 
internal threats. Civilian control is weak, and the military tends to launch coup d’états when the 
state perceives low external but high internal threats to its security (Ibid 13-4). Desch does not 
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account for the effect of high external threat perceptions on the military’s indirect interventions, 
suggesting that the absence of military takeovers defines stable civil-military relations. 
 
 2.8 Turkey: Historical Legacies 
 Literature on Turkish civil-military relations mainly explored the impact of historical 
legacies (Cook 2007; Güney 2002; Harris 1965, 1988; Heper 1991, 1992, 2011; Heper and Güney 
1996, 2000, 2004; Kamrava 2000; Karabelias 1999; Narli 2000) on the military’s propensity to 
intervene. The Ottoman historical legacy of resolving state disputes through military action 
continued until the Republican era, allowing the military to maintain a dominant role in 
government and in the society (Narli 200, 108). Güney (2002, 162-3) and Harris (1988, 180-1) 
further add the Turkish War of Independence and the personal influence of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
to the historical legacies that shaped the behavior of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in the 
Turkish Republic and informed the guardianship role of the military. Karabelias (1999, 142) argues 
that the Kemalist elite that dominated politics in the Turkish republic inherited the traditions of the 
military-bureaucratic coalition that ruled the Ottoman empire, resuming the political and military 
modernization process already underway during the 19th century to prevent foreign intervention 
in domestic affairs. The Turkish military thus perceives itself as the guardian of the state and has 
intervened to safeguard the secular Turkish Republic against internal and external threats 
according to its foundational Kemalist principles (Heper and Güney 2000, 637; 2004, 183).  
 
 Cook (2007, 101) and Kamrava (2000, 74) argue that the commitment to uphold the secular 
character of the Turkish republic and the military’s threat perceptions to internal security from 
Islamist-oriented political parties in any ruling coalition, affected the TAF’s decisions to intervene 
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directly in domestic politics to reinstate political stability. Kamrava (200, 73) argues that the 
historical role of the Turkish military has thus been that of an arbitrator (Perlmutter 1981, 25), as 
its withdrawals after interventions demonstrate that the main interest is to defend the political and 
social order and not to assume military rule. Narli (2000, 120) argues that military interventions 
increased when weak civilian governments were unable to resolve disagreements with the armed 
forces. Contrary, military influence in politics declined when strong disagreements between the 
political and military leadership were absent and the civilian government effectively “maintained 
political stability” (Ibid).    
 
 2.9 Civil-military Concordance 
 Scholarly research in the sub-field of civil-military relations remained engaged with 
Huntington’s (1957) military professionalism hypothesis. Cizre (1997, 152) argued that 
professionalism, while increasing the institutional autonomy of the TAF, did not decrease the 
military’s propensity to intervene in political affairs. The Turkish military had institutional 
autonomy, controlling the recruitment, military education, and promotion of junior personnel, as 
well as the enforcement mechanisms. The development and adherence to the Kemalist doctrine in 
the military allowed the TAF to maintain its political autonomy and resulted in military 
interventions in politics (Ibid). Historical legacies assisted the construction of the guardianship 
role of the military in the Turkish Republic, and the TAF was able to retain its influence on politics 
by evoking constitutional reasons and maintain its institutional autonomy (Ibid, 153). The TAF’s 
political autonomy stems from its commitment to Kemalist principles, and their determination to 
ensure that post-coup power transition occurred through democratic means, showed the legitimacy 
of the civilian rule (Ibid). 
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 The understanding of civil-military relations as a partnership between the political and 
civilian leaderships characterized by periods of high and low disagreement (Narli, 2000) is based 
on Schiff’s (1992, 1995) concordance hypothesis. Schiff (1995,8) argues that the dominant 
separation theories in civil-military relations literature, such as Huntington’s “objective civilian 
control” were dismissive of historical or cultural reasons that prevented the separation of civilian 
and military spheres. Israel and India are cited as cases where the absence of military intervention 
in the form of a military takeover and respect for civilian authority is not attributed to institutional 
autonomy and separation (Schiff 1992, 8; 1995, 17-21). The likelihood of military intervention is 
decreased because of the agreement that exists between the civilian and the military leadership on 
the social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method 
and military style (Schiff 1995, 14-6). 
 
 2.10 Organizational Motives  
 Huntington’s association of military professionalism and depoliticization conflicts with 
empirical evidence on officer corps’ political activism (cf. Cizre 1997; Perlmutter 1969; Schiff 
1992) yet his assertion that high standards of military professionalism require subordination to 
civilian authority (Huntington 1957, 79) is accepted as the “the ethic that governs the relationship 
between civilians and the military” and determines the military’s propensity to intervene (Feaver 
1999, 226; Finer 1962; Fitch 1998). Research on the impact of the organizational structure of the 
military on military intervention advanced Finer’s (1962) and Janowitz’s (1964, 1977) arguments 
that organizational unity and internal cohesion increased the military’s political strength (Brooks 
2008; Lee 2005; O’Donnell 1986). Lee (2005, 84) argues that internal cohesion in a unit or 
24 
organization, designed to reinforce commitment of each member to each other and the group’s 
mission, affects the military’s capacity to intervene in domestic politics.  
 
 Organizational unity is a measure of the extent to which corporate interests are perceived 
and defined by the officer corps (Nordlinger, 1976) and internal consensus allows the military 
leadership to present a united front that can exert more pressure on the ruling coalition (Brooks 
2008, 31-32). Differences in perception to what constitutes a threat to the institutional interests of 
the military impedes internal cohesion and decreases the likelihood of a direct military intervention 
(Lee 2005, 96). Empirical evidence on Africa conflict with the internal cohesion hypothesis. 
Kposowa and Jenkins (1993) demonstrate that factionalized militaries are more coup prone. They 
find that internal cleavages and factional loyalties in the militaries in African states, stemming 
from grievances regarding staffing policies during colonial administration, have created tensions 
within the military establishment that manifest through frequent coup d’états (Kposowa and 
Jenkins 1993, 863-4).  
 
 2.11 Civil-military Bargaining 
 Mutually exclusive approaches seem to have fallen out favor in literature. Rather than 
testing every hypothesis against the ideal of non-permeable borders between the civilian and 
military spheres, scholars have viewed periods of political stability as an indication of successful 
bargaining between the civil and military leadership (Brooks 2008, Cook 2007) and have 
synthesized multiple approaches to understand the breakdown of agreements. Military coup d’etats 
are considered bargaining failures, as settlement of disputes between the political and military 
leadership are costly (Svolik, 2012). Political leaders may therefore attempt to undermine the 
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military’s organizational unity and internal cohesion by selectively empowering parts of the 
military establishment (Kandil 2012) or addressing military grievances in a unit and not a corporate 
level, by bilateral negotiations (Stacher, 2012). Other coup-proofing strategies involve 
counterbalancing units within the military and security sector (Belkin & Schofer 2003; De Bruin 
2018; Powell 2012, Quinlivan 1999a, 1999b) or encouraging factionalism within the military by 
stacking it with allied ethnic or sectarian groups (Roessler 2016; Quinlivan 1999b). Powell (2012, 
1033) distinguishes between attempted and successfully executed military coup d’états and finds 
limiting organizational resources for the military while building up paramilitary forces reduces the 
likelihood of a successful coup. Scholars also explore the interaction between multiple state actors 
dealing with repression in non-democratic states, such as the military, the police and the security 
sector (Brooks 2013, Kandil 2012) to understand how conflicting interests may undermine internal 
cohesion and prompt military defections.  
 
 Finer (1962) and Huntington (1957) agreed that military professionalism underlined the 
ethic that determined military subordination to civilian authority and the military’s propensity to 
intervene. For Huntington (1977) security threats to the state and domestic political institutions 
shaped military ethic and thus the nature of civil-military relations.  Welch and Smith’s (1974) 
thesis that civilian institutions offer opportunities for political participation also contribute to this 
comparative analysis between Israeli and Turkish civil military relations. The concept of state 
autonomy, defined as a characteristic of a modern political system that is insulated from the impact 
of non-political groups and procedures (Huntington 1968, 20) is vital to understand the impact of 
political institutions. According to Huntington, a political organization that is the instrument of a 
particular social group, family or class lacks autonomy. Thus, political parties are the most 
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important instruments to create a modern and autonomous polity, as they most successfully 
aggregate and overcome narrow interest. The assumption underlying this statement is that in a 
modern political system, parties do not express interests of certain groups in a manner that would 
present them as general interests. Political parties provide multiple outlets for the political 
participation of a non-political group such as the military to exert influence and thus should reduce 





3. Methodological Approach 
 This study is a comparison between the historical paths of the military in Turkey and Israel 
aiming to identify the conditions that prompted direct military intervention in one case. Historical 
institutionalism, neither a fully-fledged history nor a fully developed method but rather an 
approach (Steinmo 2008, 118), is helpful in identifying critical junctures in history when political 
decisions taken in a time-period shaped decisions in the future. Critical junctures are brief time-
periods during which political actors are able to create and define political institutions according 
to their interests. Wars, financial crises, military coups etc. are generally considered as critical 
junctures (Collier and Collier 1991, 31).  
 
 At the core of historical institutionalism is that politics should not be studied in a historical 
vacuum, as focus on the historical origins of institutions facilitates the understanding of future 
political decisions and institutional relationships. Institutions are the formal organizations and 
rules that shape political behavior. As governance occurs through formal institutions such as states, 
parliaments, political parties, constitutions, international organizations and many others, studying 
their differences assists our understanding of the behavior of political actors. Though institutions 
are important in shaping political decisions, they are not considered the “sole cause of outcomes” 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 3). Once institutions are created, a self-reinforcing process is initiated 
that is very difficult to reverse. The concept of path dependence essentially means that that “what 
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell 1996, 262-63). That is, the creation of an institution sets 
off a process designer to reinforce the institution, making political alternatives unacceptable. 
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4. Case Selection and Hypothesis   
 While the focus of this study remains on the explanatory value of political institutions as a 
major determinant of military interventions, historical institutionalism allows the investigation of 
the interaction between variables to compare civil-military relations in Israel and Turkey. Despite 
their deficiencies, Israel and Turkey remain relatively the most democratic states in the Middle 
East, yet by merely considering their political systems, it is difficult to account for the different 
types of military influence and intervention in politics. For that reason, some key concepts from 
Historical Institutionalism, such as critical junctures, help trace the development of civil-military 
relation and explain the occurrence of phenomena such as military coups. Still, the formation of a 
working hypothesis which argues that principles and institutions adopted during state formation 
influence future political decisions is useful: 
 
 H: The greater the influence of the military on decision-making during the state building 
period, the greater that influence is likely to be in the future. 
 
 Turkey and Israel have certain similarities that explain their militaries’ pervasive influence 
in politics and differences that explain the types and levels of military intervention in politics and 
identifying critical junctures will indicate how shifts in the balance of civil-military relations 
occurred. Both armies defended the independence of their countries and became major actors 
during the state-building process. The TAF inherited traditions from the Ottoman army, and IDF 
from the Haganah, the military underground of the Jewish community during the British Mandate 
in Palestine, which they carried into the new state. The founding fathers of Turkey and Israel, 
Atatürk and Ben-Gurion respectively, had a profound impact on civil-military relations, as they 
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emphasized absolute military subordination to the civilian leadership and enacted laws 
accordingly. In both countries, military influence has overall been accepted by the society, as the 
military officers are generally admired (Heper and Itzkowitz-Shifrinson 2005, 232).  
 
 In Turkey, continuing military interventions have raised criticism against the military. 
Similarly, public criticism against the wars that Israel has initiated, especially since the 1982 
Lebanon War, has increased. The marginalization of the military’s role in domestic politics the 
past decade may indicate that public perception has had an impact on civil-military relations. The 
2016 military coup attempt in Turkey failed and civilian control of the military seems to be 
reconsolidated by the AKP around President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The first time the role of the 
IDF in politics was questioned by the civilian leadership in Israel was with the election of Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, who was especially critical of the military’s involvement 
in the peace process. The dislike between Netanyahu and the military was mutual, and many high-
ranking reservists, among them former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, campaigned with 
opposition parties to defeat Netanyahu in 1999 (Peri 2006, 80-81).  
 
 Netanyahu was defeated in 1999 but was voted again into power in 2009 and 2019. 
Netanyahu remained critical of the military interventions, yet unlike Erdoğan has been unable to 
bring about a shift in civil-military relations in Israel. There are two reasons for this, which are 
traced back to the state-building period. Unlike Turkey, the Israeli military does not have an 
institutional ideology. When disputes between civilian and military leaderships arise, political 
leaders will not clash with the entire military institution. More importantly, military officers can 
easily enter the political arena post-retirement. The dissolution of the paramilitary organizations 
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(Haganah, Irgun, Levi) and their consolidation of forces into a professional army did not spell the 
demise of their respective political wings. Political competition in Israel has been channeled 
through the multiparty democratic elections, and especially after the Six Days War, former officers 

































5. Case Study: Turkey 
 5.1 The Founding of the Turkish Republic 
 The creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was a major departure from the Ottoman 
past, as new political, legal and social institutions were formed. In other ways, the Turkish 
Republic evinced characteristics of the Ottoman  era,  such as the strong state tradition, the 
continuation of the political reforms that started in the Reform (Tanzimat) period (1839-1876) of 
the Ottoman  Empire, and a strong army that was perceived as a modernizing force (Harris 1988; 
Güney 2002; Karbellias 1999; Rustow 1959). Political change in Turkey was brought about with 
the organization of a resistance movement by Mustafa Kemal (later called Atatürk, father of the 
Turks), a general and victorious commander during World War I who was sent to the interior to 
maintain and supervise the demobilization of the Ottoman armies. Atatürk instead collaborated 
with other leading army and navy officers to plan the resistance (Rustow 1968, 797). Despite 
being a middle-ranking military bureaucrat, the post at the War Ministry allowed him to take a 
personal hand in the staff work that prepared his mission.  
 
 Kemal quickly established contact with the organization of the by then defunct “Young 
Turk” Union and Progress Party (Rustow, 1959, 549) and established his leadership through a 
network of associates that coordinated regions and groups across the Ottoman Empire. Turkish 
troops at that time were not under close supervision from the state, yet they maintained their 
discipline and hierarchical chain of command, while the former Union and Progress party had built 
an impressive party organization that spread even to remote rural regions. Through the local party 
organizations led by administrative officials, intellectuals and land owners formed the civilian base 
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of the resistance movement; central administration bureaucrats and provincial representatives did 
not embrace the nationalist cause advocated by the party (Ibid 542). 
 
Kemal organized local defense units and civilian organizations into a central organization 
with a representative committee (Representative Committee of the Defense Organization), 
transforming effectively the opposition into a counter-government that called for elections to a new 
National Assembly in May 1923 (Smith 1959, 31). The election order, addressed to the 
commanding general of the army corps, provincial administrators and governors, called for the 
election of five representatives from each province to attend the assembly along with the deputies 
from the Istanbul Parliament. The newly elected provincial delegates (232) and the deputies from 
Istanbul (106) together with  former Ottoman members of the parliament (99) formed the first 
Grand National Assembly (Ibid 52).  
The first Turkish Grand National Assembly was dominated by military and civil 
bureaucrats as evident in its composition. Government officials accounted for 43% of the 437 
deputies (23% bureaucrats, 15% military officers and 5% educators), 17% were religious 
officials, 18% independent professionals and 13% were in banking and trading. The cultivation 
of the extensive network into rural regions yielded 6% of the deputies, all major landowners. 
The vast majority of the leadership positions in the First Assembly were occupied by military 
bureaucrats with university education (Ibid 53).  Thus, both the movement and the party were 
controlled by high level bureaucrats who managed the lower officials and accommodated various 
interest groups (Ibid 62).  
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Kemal was able to obtain a decree from religious officials against the Sultan, claiming 
the territorial concessions of the Ottoman Empire to the Allies constituted a betrayal of the 
Islamic faith to Western infidels At the same time, Kemal was able to use the occupation of 
Istanbul by the Allies to continue the resistance under the pretext of nationalist cause that the 
capitulated Sultan was unable to undertake, often combining a pro- religious and nationalist 
rhetoric (Rustow 1959, 545).   
 
 5.2 The Single-party Era (1923-1945) 
 The People’s Party was officially founded after the 1923 elections. Atatürk ruled under a 
single party until his death in 1938, and as in other revolutionary movements, so in Turkey the 
consolidation of democracy often required non-democratic means. Cook (2007, 15) argues that 
despite Kemalists’ intentions to create institutions for political participation, the military officers 
were “high modernists” who were “inherently authoritarian” and believed that their training and 
skills qualified them to exercise political power. This self-concept of professionalism in the 
Turkish army, based on a definition of expertise, created a sense of corporatism and occupational 
entitlement to political power (cf. Jencks 1982 12; Perlmutter 1977, 313). 
 
 Following a brief split (1924-1925) and the formation of an oppostion party, the 
Progressive Republican Party (TRF, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) by Kemal’s former 
associates  Generals Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Rauf Orbay, the party was renamed 
as the Republican People’s Party (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). The TRF was closed down 
following allegations about its involvement in the Kurdish-religious Sheykh Said Rebellion in 
1925 (Rustow 1964, 365). The second attempt in 1930 by religious and conservative groups critical 
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of Kemalist reforms to form an opposition party was also short-lived. The Liberal Republican 
Party (SCF, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) was banned three months after its creation in 1930. 
 
 The six principles of Kemalism, officially adopted in 1930 were republicanism, secularism, 
populism, nationalism, statism and reformism. The new Turkish state was a constitutional republic, 
and republicanism emphasized that Turkey as nation-state had severed ties to its imperial Ottoman 
past. Though the Muslim character in society was recognized, the defining character of the new 
state was based on the Turkish nation, and being a Turk re-emphasized the foundations of the new 
nation-state, concepts emphasized by secularism and nationalism (Fisher 1963, 26; Mehmet 1983, 
50).  
 While in the Ottoman empire the major arbitrator in politics was the military higher class 
(Perlmutter 1981, 25), populism meant to signify that state sovereignty and legitimacy derived 
from the Turkish people. Statism referred to the statist economic reforms adopted in the 1930s and 
emphasized strong government regulation of economic activities. Finally, reformism indicated the 
Republic’s commitment to replace traditional values and institutions in the path to modernization 
(Fisher 1963, 27-8). 
Active military service was deemed incompatible with election to the parliament in 1924 
(Rustow 1959, 545) and officers supporting the Kemalist regime resigned their commissions. The 
officers’ exclusion from elected posts was counterbalanced by the guardianship role assigned to 
the military. This guardianship role was enshrined in the constitution the Article 35 of the Army 
Internal Service Law of 1935, where it was stated that the duty of the armed forces to defend and 
to protect the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic. The army effectively became the 
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protector of Kemalist reforms and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were thus allowed to 
bypass civilian control when the government did not act in the public interest (Harris 1965).  
The 1923-1946 period of the Turkish Republic is characterized by a stagnation of 
political and military reforms in favor of economic development and social changes (Mehmet 
1983) and is also referred to as the single-party period. The three most important men during this 
period were two former military leaders, President Kemal Atatürk (from 1923 to his death in 
1938), Prime Minister Ismet Inonu (from 1923 to 1924 and 1925 to 1937), and CGS Marshal 
Fevzi Çakmak (from 1923 to 1944), who had close personal ties to Ataturk and enjoyed 
considerable autonomy over the military’s internal affairs (Heper and Güney 1996, 620).  
 Institutions such as the Supreme Military Council were created to provide high-ranking 
military leaders a venue to share their concerns with the civilian leadership. This arrangement 
emphasized the subordination of the military to the civilian leadership, while the military was 
offered a form of political participation. As mentioned above, former military officers did not 
exceed the percentage of bureaucrats in the parliament but occupied top leadership positions in 
the cabinet (Smith 1959, 53). The National Defense, Internal Affairs, Public Work and 
Communication Ministries were occupied by former officers or Kemalist civilians (Frey 1965, 
260). In fact, the first cabinet that did not include former military officers was formed by Prime 
Minister Hasan Saka and president Inonu in 1948 (Rustow 1959, 550). During CHP rule the 
officers were disinclined to engage in a power struggle with the civilian leadership, yet it is 
difficult to argue that effective civilian control of the military was exercised when the most 
leadership positions in the civilian government were occupied by former officers (Harris 1965). 
The Turkish military was the strongest institution at the birth of the new state, having successfully 
fought a war against the France, the U.K. and Greece that cancelled the territorial partition plans 
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outlined in the Treaty of Sèvres. As the recipient of German, and after 1918 Russian training and 
aid it was the only modernized force that could promote economic reforms during the initial state-
building phase (Johnson 1963, Thompson 1974). The new political elite, a coalition of military 
officers and civilian bureaucrats, shared a political ideology that was eventually enshrined in the 
constitution. The CHP made Kemalism the official ideology of the Turkish Republic and the 
military the designated guardian of both. In practice, the military bureaucrats that dominated the 
CHP neither created participatory institutions, nor sought to promote professionalism in the 
military to depoliticize the officer corps.  
 
 During the single-party era, civil-military relations in the Turkish Republic were 
characterized by a cooperation between the civilian and military leadership, as key government 
posts were occupied by former military leaders (cf. Schiff 1995). The absence of direct military 
interventions in non-liberal democracies, or else ow competition between the civilian and the 
military leadership is a characteristic of civil-military relations in party-states (Ben-Eliezer, 2014). 
The subjective civilian control model facilitates our understanding of civil-military relations 
during the single-party period. The CHP aimed to maximize its control of the state by making the 
TAF the guardian of the regime (cf. Huntington 1957). Promoting military professionalism while 
ensuring that the military remained politicized best served this purpose (cf. Van Doorn 1969). 
Professionalism, especially in the higher echelons did not depoliticize the officers but reinforced 
their corporate identity (cf. Cizre 1997; Perlmutter 1977) and created the conditions for future 
intervention, should there be disputes with civilian leadership (cf. Finer 1962) and corporate 
interests at stake (Nordlinger 1976).  
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 The determination to uphold the political order, promote economic reforms and defend 
Kemalist principles inhibited the creation of democratic participatory institutions. Opposition 
parties that were critical of Kemalist reforms were banned. The single-party period inhibited the 
consolidation of democratic reforms and the development of a political alternative to solving 
disputes. The military’s opportunity to participate in politics was through its partnership with CHP. 
Transition to multi-party politics could potentially reduce the political influence of the TAF, and 
direct military interventions aimed to prevent this outcome. 
 5.3 Multi-party politics (1946-1960) 
The Republican People's Party (CHP) remained a coalition of military and civil 
bureaucrats managing a centrally planned economy that was hostile to rural economic interests, 
unable to turn agricultural surplus to the industrialization target that was set. In order to pacify 
disgruntled landowners and businessmen that remained underrepresented in the 
parliament, the CHP had not pursued economic or land reforms.  By 1945, the new generation 
of state and party bureaucrats was pushing for land reforms, only to result in the landowners 
leaving the CHP to form an opposition party (Harris 1970, 443). To prevent possible dissolution 
of the CHP, President Inonu allowed the formation of political opposition parties. 
The CHP acquiescence towards a more open political system was also indicative of the 
confidence in the resilience of the regime, as the leaders of the newly formed Democratic Party 
were all former ranking members of the Republican People’s Party and largely expected to share 
the same experiences and enact the same policies (Ibid 445) Moreover, as Turkey aimed to secure 
economic and military aid from the United States government, fearing potential Russian 
encroachment on Turkish territory, the adoption of the multi-party system was important to gain 
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the support of the West, which was discontented with Turkey’s neutrality in the war (Harris 1972; 
Sadak 1949). 
While in 1945 the prospect of an opposition party securing the popular vote remained 
distant, the overwhelming majority by which the Democratic Party (DP) won the 1950 elections 
threatened to turn the temporary deposition of the Republican People’s Party from the seats of 
power to permanent. The Democratic Party, the first ruling party in Turkey whose leaders did not 
emerge through ties to the military, managed to maintain support throughout three general 
elections between 1950-60 while the CHP was reduced to a minority (Harris 1970, 441).   
As the CHP was led by the interests of the civilian and military bureaucrats, the 
Democratic Party appeared to be equally guided by commercial and landed interests and sought 
to extend party control over the state apparatus and reverse policies of the formerly state-directed 
economy that placed restrictions on the flow of foreign capital (Karpat 1959). Whether the 
Democratic Party earnestly sought the support of the military is questionable, as Article 23 of the 
Constitution enacted in 1924 prohibited active military officers from being elected to the 
Parliament. Despite its promises, the Democratic Party did not promote policies that regulated 
the flow of foreign capital to the private sector, but rather increased state intervention in the 
economy in an effort to consolidate what can be identified at that point as the party’s control of 
the state apparatus. 
 
 5.4 The First Military Coup (May 27, 1960) 
 By 1960, Adnan Menderes’ government’s legitimacy was weakened in the eyes of a 
significant part of the society due to the antidemocratic policies regarding separations of powers 
and restriction of the freedoms of speech and expression, press and association (Harris 1970, 439). 
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The Turkish army launched a coup in 1960 with the claim of reestablishing the constitutional order 
and democracy that was breached by Adnan Menderes’ Democratic Party government’s rule. The 
direct military intervention on May 27, 1960, was largely accepted by the society, particularly by 
the opponents of the government. The general impression was that the army acted on the belief 
that that Menderes government planned a return to single-party rule by abolishing the CHP (Dodd 
1969, 28). Menderes’ close relations with the religious and Kurdish groups were also raising 
concerns in the military, who viewed such political behavior as a deviation from Kemalist 
principles.  
 
 Adding to the concerns, the military faced the prospect of becoming a political tool to a 
government prepared to use the state apparatus for partisan interests. While during the single-party 
period there was military cooperation with the civilian elites in policymaking, there was no 
common ideological affiliation between the TAF and the Democratic Party to guarantee a similar 
arrangement. The transition to a multi-party political system in Turkey introduced a contender to 
the Kemalist regime for state control, and the military, as the protector of the regime and the 
Turkish Republic, intervened because an overturn of the political order would spell the demise of 
its political role. 
 
 The 1961 Constitution approved by the military dictatorship institutionalized the military’s 
political influence through the creation of the National Security Council (Harris 2011). The council 
presented a legitimizing forum for the military to express its opinion on national security related 
issues and was composed of the Chief of General Staff (CGS), representatives of the forces, the 
ministers of Defense, Interior and Foreign affairs, the Prime Minister and the President. As 
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abovementioned, Article 23 of the first Constitution in 1924 prohibited active military officers 
from being elected to the Parliament. This article also prevented the CGS from participating in the 
government and made him responsible to the President. In 1944, the CGS was made responsible 
to the Prime Ministry, in the 1961 Constitution became subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and 
in 1982 was made responsible to the Prime Ministry once again. As of 2016, the CGS was 
answering directly to the President.  
 
 The multi-party system would largely remain in place with the 1961 constitutions, with 
elections determining the government. The reintegration of the military and Kemalists into the 
political system was conducted through their placement as checks and balances in state 
bureaucratic institutions to effectively prevent a partisan takeover of the legislative and executive 
branches (Harris 2011, 205) During the 1960s the military would refrain from a direct intervention 
in the form of a coup, yet through the constitutional reforms of 1961 retained its influence in key 
political issues. The military command was not satisfied with the electoral victory of the Justice 
Party (AP, Adalet Partisi), the successor to the Democratic Party in 1965 and 1969, yet it did not 
prevent it from forming a ruling coalition, as an abolition of a political party would be an attack 
against parliamentary democracy. At the same time, the military seemed committed to upholding 
the legitimacy of the 
1960 military coup, ensuring that the military’s candidate for the Presidency, Cevdet Sunay, was 
elected by the Parliament in 1966 (Ahmad 1977, 254). 
 
 As Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was aware that the military would not look favorably 
upon the party that succeeded the Democratic Party, he accommodated the demands of the military 
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by offering prestigious political, bureaucratic and diplomatic ambassadorships to the military 
commanders, not willing to provoke the military by signaling opposition. To that purpose, in 1969 
Prime Minister Demirel convinced legislators not to pass the draft granting amnesty to politicians 
of the Democratic Party, as the CGS Memduh Tağmaç informed President Cevdet Sunay that 
commanders would resign otherwise (Ibid 281). 
 
 5.5 Intervention by Memorandum (March 12, 1971) 
 The constitutional reforms designed to prevent a political takeover of the state by a civilian 
government potentially resentful of the military, fostered an uneasy partnership between military 
and civilian leaderships through the threat of coup, and failed to produce efficient coalition 
governments that could re-introduce stability in the political system throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. As Turkey did not remain immune to Cold War politics that often resulted in armed clashes 
between political groups in the communist left and nationalist right, the coalition government 
failed to address the threats posed to its internal security. The military held accountable the political 
leadership for the ongoing anarchy and issued a memorandum, forcing President Demirel’s 
government to resign. 
 
 Unlike after the 1960s coup, the military command did not assume direct rule and along 
with the parliament agreed that the Prime-Minister should not have partisan affiliations, asking 
Nihat Erim to form the government.4 The change in the political leadership of the country did not 
                                                 
4 Nihat Erim was a law professor and a parliament member of the CHP. He left the party at the request of 
the military in to form the government in 1981 and collaborated with the military to crack down on radical 
leftist organizations. 
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end internal clashes, and the imposition of martial law in eleven provinces of Turkey was deemed 
the only solution to repress the urban guerilla activities of radical leftist groups. Prime Minister 
Erim and the military command considered the constraint of political freedoms necessary to 
address the threat to the national security of the state. 
 
 The military intervention in 1971 neither used violence against politicians nor overthrew 
the government, but displaced the existing civilian leadership, replacing it with a new civilian 
government deemed able or inclined to facilitate the military’s effort to stop the ongoing turmoil 
in the country. Despite the overthrow of the government by the military, the constitutional changes 
of 1971 restrained political rights and freedoms5 and increased military indirect interventions, 
shifting the civil-military equilibrium towards military control. Still, the intervention of the 
military as the guardian of the state’s unity failed to mitigate social and political unrest. Former 
CGS Cevdet Sunay’s term as President ended in the spring of 1973 (Harris 2011, 207) presenting 
an opportunity for politicians to place a candidate of their choice and weaken the military influence 
in politics.  
 The politicization of the military during the era of multi-party politics ensured that partisan 
politics and division would bleed over to the officer corps. A feud between CGS Memduh Tağmaç, 
politically affiliated with the AP, and Air Force Commander Muhsin Batur, who later joined the 
CHP, seemed responsible for creating a stalemate in promotions and reassignments at the top of 
the military command, affecting also the line of candidates for the presidential seat (Ibid). The 
stalemate allowed the civilian leaders to express their preference for retired Admiral Fahri 
                                                 
5 The constitutional changes left the military out of judiciary control while strengthening the military’s political 
role through the NSC and continuous martial laws. 
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Koruturk, who was considered politically neutral, as opposed to the Chief of Staff, Faruk Guler, 
whose candidacy was vetoed from within the officer corps. The military eventually accepted the 
candidate of the civilian leadership. 
 
 This incident marked a period of a strained partnership between the military and civilian 
leadership, as verbal threats of direct military intervention did not seem to affect political change. 
The civilian leadership had possibly willfully interpreted the military’s acquiescing in the matter 
of the presidency as sign of a retreat from the politics. The reluctant partnership between the 
military and civilian authorities could not be expected to last long as the incentives for both 
partners were lost; the military could no longer credibly threaten the civilian leadership. 
 
 5.6 The Second Military Coup (September 12, 1980)   
 The failure of the civilian government to respond effectively to the dramatic rise in political 
violence that was increasingly shaped by ethnic and religious politics precipitated the 1980 military 
coup. The military believed that the government’s inability to address civil strife mirrored the 
political actors’ disinclination to deal with internal conflicts among them (Hale 1988, 162) 
Amongst this chaos, the Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP Milli Salvation Party) of 
Necmettin Erbakan was able to secure enough seats in the parliament to extract concessions from 
the coalition in exchange for votes. Erbakan, the leader of the party from 1970, openly contended 
all the six principles of Kemalism were “a poor adoption of Western modernism and rationalism,” 
(Tepe 2008, 191) and the party’s ability to shape policy in education unsettled the military 
command, which viewed NSP’s actions as more more undermining than radical leftists and ethnic 
Kurds, as they challenged the legitimacy of the Kemalist regime and thus by default the survival 
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of the Turkish Republic. Sectarian and ethnic identities further complicated ideological clashes. 
Until the early 1970s the Kurdish issue was assessed in terms of its leftist ideology, whereas 
towards the end of the decade, with the establishment of PKK and the introduction of ethnic 
identities, it became a separatist movement. It had become obvious by 1980 that despite the 
imposition of martial law, especially in the Southeastern provinces, the civilian leadership could 
not cooperate with the military to restore order. 
 
 The military junta that carried out the 1980 Coup banned all political activity and placed 
the leaders of the major political parties under detention. Unlike the 1971 coup, the military 
commanders did not replace the civilian leadership, but assumed direct control over state affairs 
as after the 1960 coup, with the intention to rewrite the Constitution in order to avoid the political 
deadlock of weak coalition governments, while reinstating political freedoms that had receded 
with the imposition of martial law in the 1970s. 
 
 Between 1960 and 1980 nineteen coalition governments had been formed. The imposition 
of martial law failed to prevent armed clashes between political groups and stop the violence, and 
the legitimacy of coalition governments gradually eroded as they were unable to restore order. A 
major difference between the 1960 and 1980 coups is that the takeover was not planned within a 
military faction but was a coordinated effort by the entire military institution. The post-coup 
administration configuration of the National Security Council (NSC), included five of the highest- 
ranking generals and was led by Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren. 
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 The ban of all political activity aimed to prevent a return to the chaos of the previous 
decades by purging the political and social arena of any party official who had been active up to 
1980. The liberal constitution of 1961 was replaced with a conservative 1982 constitution, and 
Article 68 granted the right to establish political parties with prior permission. Access to politics 
was restricted to new politicians and parties, as all who were members of a party formed before 
1980 were banned from political activity for at least ten years. At the same time, the officers did 
not protest against place more restrictions on the emerging political oppostion, as they were 
reluctant to place more restriction that would further compromise the democratization process 
(Cook 2007, Heper 1991). Article 69 stipulated some of the restrictions that were indicative of the 
officers’ concerns about groups associated with ethnic or religious causes, as parties who 
advocated politics that ‘‘conflict with the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation, and the principles of the democratic and secular republic’” were prohibited (Heper 1991, 
48). Moreover, to prevent the politicization of state bureaucracy, the president was granted veto 
powers and the right to appoint all high-ranking bureaucrats. In practice however, and despite the 
design of this national security state, the generals were reluctant to further compromise the 
legitimacy of the first post-coup elections, and despite the defeat of the new parties that had 
emerged under military supervision, did not contest Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP, 
Anavatan Partisi) victory (Cook 2007, 105). 
 
 The repeated military interventions had eroded the military’s legitimacy and the successful 
transition to a multi-party democratic system was essential for the military to reconsolidate its 
political power (Heper 1991; Heper and Güney 1996). The decision of the military to withdraw 
and accommodate the opposition during the post-coup transition to democracy was instrumental 
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in shaping what the Kemalist civil-military bureaucratic establishment feared: the rise of a counter-
elite whose identity was mainly shaped by Islam (Heper 1991, 50). Islamist movements and 
religious networks such as the Gulenists were able to profit from the economic liberalization 
polices of the Ozal administration in 1980s which sought to form broad-based coalition, 
contributing to the rise of the Welfare Party (RP Refah Partisi) in the 1990s (Öniş 1997, 757) and 
precipitated another confrontation between the military establishment and politicians.  
 5.7 Intervention by Memorandum: The ‘Postmodern’ Coup (February 28, 
1996)   
 The 1980 coup was a turning point in Turkey’s political and economic development, as the 
economic reforms proved critical in the growth of Islamic business and the rise of political Islam 
as a movement. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal promoted a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" ideology that 
emphasized the Islamic identity of the Turks whose origins were traced back to the Ottoman 
Empire (Cook 2007, 107). The military did not protest the re-introduction of religion into the 
national education curriculum, most likely because they were more interested in marginalizing the 
communists (Kedourie 1996, 190), and permitted Islamist parties like the RP to remain active in 
the political arena.  
 
 The RP was the successor party to NSP and continued to reject the founding principles of 
the Republican regime and opposed secularism. Erbakan described RP’s ideology as the only one 
with a national view (milli gorus) and maintained that the concept of Turkish nationalism 
aggravated ethnic conflict in Turkey, as it undermined Muslim identity (Cook 2007, 106). Despite 
criticism and political opposition, the formation of a coalition government without the RP proved 
impossible in 1996. True Path (DYP, Doğru Yol Partisi) leader Tansu Ciller formed a coalition 
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government with the RP, making Necmettin Erbakan Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister on 28 
June 1996. 
 
 Erbakan’s foreign policy initiatives included state visits to Iran and Libya, economic 
cooperation with Muslim countries and establishing close relations with Islamic groups such as 
the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, the Lebanese Hezbollah Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Palestinian Hamas. More importantly, the solution that RP proposed to address Kurdish grievances 
and to end PKK violence was the promotion of the Muslim identity in order to eliminate the 
problem of Kurdish separatism (Cook 2007, 119). The military officers remained watchful, yet 
eventually joined the anti-government campaign by the media and civil society organizations 
(Heper and Guney 2000, 641), following the outrage against the RP’s decision to shut down a 
corruption investigation against DYP and an incident where a female reporter, sent to cover an 
event organized by the RP-governed Sincan municipality, was beaten by a group of religious 
fundamentalists. The National Security Council (NSC) met on 28 February 1997 and declared that 
any “groups aiming to create an Islamic republic based on Sharia law in Turkey constitute a multi-
directional threat to the democratic, secular social-law state as defined by the Constitution” (Gunay 
2001, 17). A memorandum of that meeting titled NSC Decision No: 406 containing eighteen points 
to fight the Islamist threat, was unwillingly singed by Erbakan. Despite resistance to its 
implementation, the February NSC meeting set off a process whereby combined military and 
social pressure forced Erbakan’s resignation. Turkey’s Constitutional Court dissolved the RP and 
banned Erbakan from politics for five years (Cook 2007, 124-6). 
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 The 1997 military intervention is referred to as the “February 28 Process” and showcases 
what many scholars (Güney 2002; Harris 1988; Heper 1991, 1992, 2011; Heper and Güney 2000, 
2004; Karabelias 1999) considered to be a major problem in Turkish politics, the clash between 
the secular military establishment and Islamist political groups. However, the decision not to 
displace the government by a military takeover indicates the change scholars have identified on 
how the coup prone militaries perceived the defense of corporate and national interests during the 
process of democratization (Fitch 1998; Heper 1985, 1991; Heper and Güney 1996; Hunter 1995, 
1998; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Pion-Berlin 1992). Moreover, it seems that unlike during the previous 
interventions (cf. Heper 1985, 1991), in 1997 the TAF had allies in the civil society that provided 
a platform to campaign against Erbakan’s government. 
 
 The disinclination to intervene by imposing military rule undermined the military’s ability 
to use coups as credible threats to pressure the civilian government. The presidential election of 
2007, towards the end of Erdoğan’s first term, provided the setting for the next major clash between 
the civilian and the military leaderships. Abdullah Gül’s candidacy was vetoed by the CGS Yaşar 
Büyükanıt, warning the AKP by posting a memorandum on the military’s official website on April 
2007 that the next president should be a secular person, otherwise the military would take action, 
implying a coup (Karakaya and Pusane, 2016).  
 
 Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan had managed to establish strong relations with the USA, the EU, 
and the Gülen Organization, and had the support of the liberals and the business elite. Moreover, 
from 1999 the prospect of an EU membership required Turkey to align its policies with that of EU 
members, including harmonizing civil-military relations with European practices. Erdoğan was 
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able to present the AKP as a victim of military encroachment on domestic politics, aware that EU 
pressure placed restriction on the military’s power (Gürsoy 2012). If the military had been 
unwilling to launch a coup in 1997 when Erbakan was in a weak position, it was highly unlikely 
to do so against a far more powerful Erdoğan. The AKP insisted on Gül’s candidacy in their power 
struggle with the military, and General Büyükanıt’s warning had the opposite effect: the AKP 
increased its votes more than 12% (Gürsoy 2012, 200). The fact that the military no longer exerted 
the same influence indicated a shift in the civil-military relations in Turkey and a marginalization 
of the TAF’s political role, decreasing the likelihood of successful interventions.  
 
 In order to remove the legal base for military’s direct and indirect interventions, the 
Parliament, in which the AKP had the majority, changed Article 35 of the Internal Service Law in 
2013. The law did not specify direct military intervention, but the military interpreted the law that 
it was the army’s responsibility and duty to protect the state against any danger even if it were the 
government or the society itself. At this point, the army became an arbitrator of political outcomes, 
deciding what and who constituted a threat to the state and the regime. With the amendment, the 
army would no longer deal with internal threats because it defined the role and responsibilities of 
the army as “the mission of the Armed Forces is to defend Turkish territory against the foreign-
borne threats and dangers; to ensure that the military strength is maintained and strengthened to 
ensure deterrence; to carry out the missions abroad assigned by the decision of Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey, and to assist in ensuring international peace.”6  
 
                                                 
6 "Turkish Armed Forces". 2013. Tsk.Tr. https://www.tsk.tr/Sayfalar?viewName=Mission.  
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 President Erdogan and the AKP-led government have declared the Gülen Organization 
responsible for the July 2015 attempted coup and have used emergency powers to arrest, prosecute 
or dismiss an estimated 100,000 Turkish citizens in military, civil service, education and media 
sectors (The Economist, 2016b). Heper (1985 87-8; 1991 16-20) argues that the military in Turkey, 
despite society’s acceptance of the legitimacy of the interventions, lacked allies in the society to 
take over the state and were largely motivated out of institutional interests. In Turkey the military 
played an educational role and trained conscripts, facilitating their integration into the new state 
and society (Rustow 1964, 453). Similar to Israel, Turkey the army is composed of both these 
conscripts and the professional officers, however, unlike Israel, in Turkey there is no reserve 
service. In Turkey all male citizens have to do obligatory military service; while in Israel all male 
and female Israeli citizens except for Muslim Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews have to go to the 
army (Cohen 1999). Heper and Itzkowitz-Shifrinson (2005, 242) argue that toward the end of the 
20th century and especially at the prospect of an EU membership, there is an observable increase 
of civilian control, which has reduced many of the responsibilities of the military. The 2013 
amendment in Article 36 of the Internal Service Law stipulates that “the Armed Forces is assigned 
to the duty of learning and teaching art of war,”7 further limiting the TAF’s non-military functions. 
The gradual erosion of the Turkish military’s responsibilities and marginalization of role in society 
compromised its ability both to execute a successful coup and find allies in civilian society.  
                                                 
7 Ibid 
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6. Case Study: Israel 
 6.1 The Haganah Period 
 The Israeli military establishment developed from local paramilitary groups to a national 
army, the Haganah (Defense), in 1920. The Haganah was the military underground of the Jewish 
community, a loose federation of local militia groups operating in Palestine under the British 
mandate. Under the leadership of the Jewish Agency and Histadrut (General Federation of 
Laborers in the Land of Israel), the Haganah followed a policy of havlaga (restraint) against both 
Britain and Arabs. Within the organization operated groups such the Irgun, led by Ze’ev 
Jabotinsky, that favored an offensive policy against the Arabs.   
 
 Jabotinsky died in 1940, and further division within the Jewish military underground 
was created with the formation of Lehi (Israel’s Freedom Fighters) by Abraham Stern. The Lehi 
was smaller than Irgun, having a few hundred fighters, yet engaged in more violent acts and 
terrorist attacks against the British administration. The antagonism between the three groups was 
so severe that they attacked each other, burned other groups’ vehicles, raided arsenals, and 
kidnapped and tortured the members of other groups (van Creveld 1998, 55-56). The conflict 
reached its height during 1944-45, when Haganah eventually arrested hundreds of Irgun and Lehi 
members at the request of the British authorities (Ben-Eliezer 1998, 115-28). 
 
 The struggle between the three paramilitary groups continued into the establishment of the 
State of Israel, as declared by David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency, on May 14, 1948. 
The political rivalry between the Haganah, the Irgun and the Lehi could complicate the transition 
to statehood, as multiple military forces contradicted his “one front-one authority” policy (Ibid 
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163). As the leaders of these paramilitary groups– Menachem Begin (Irgun), Yitzhak Shamir 
(Lehi) and Yigal Allon (Palmach, a military unit in the Haganah)– challenged his political 
leadership, Ben-Gurion declared an unofficial war against these groups. 
 
 The Altalena Affair in June 1948 was the first confrontation between Ben-Gurion and 
Menachem Begin, leader of the Irgun. Despite Begin’s agreement to dissolve Irgun and send its 
members to the IDF, a large quantity of arms found on Altalena, an Irgun ship, presented the 
pretext for Ben-Gurion to order a military attack on the ship, as Begin insisted on keeping twenty 
percent of the arms for Irgun battalion in IDF. The Altalena Affair, ending with the loss of lives 
on board and the sinking of the arms did not escalate into a civil war, as the Irgun was finally 
integrated into the IDF (Castlewitz 2009). 
 
 On September 17, 1948 Count Folke Bernadotte, a Swedish diplomat who worked in Israel 
as the United Nations (UN) mediator, was assassinated by Lehi members because his proposal 
offered a smaller Jewish state than the UN Resolution of November 1947. The proposal was not 
well received by the formal government, yet the assassination served as a pretext to arrest Lehi 
members and dissolve the organization (van Creveld 1998, 89). The Palmach, Haganah’s elite 
military force, was integrated into the IDF in November. Palmach was founded in May 1941 and 
was the first full-time professional military unit of the Jewish military. Among the officers that 
served in the Palmach and later in the IDF post-independence were Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, 
Yigal Allon and Chaim Bar-Lev. A defining feature of this group was its ideological adherence to 
socialism and the kibbutz movement, which may have complicated the process of forming a 
professional army (Perlmutter 1969, 35-40). However, unlike Irgun and Lehi, Palmach’s 
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integration into the IDF took place in a smooth way, despite the fact several Palmach leaders 
viewed the decision to dissolve the Palmach as political, aimed to eliminate the power of Palmach 
and its leader Yigal Allon who achieved military victory on the Negev desert (Ibid 52). 
 
 Ben-Gurion managed to bring several autonomous paramilitary units and their leaders 
under civilian control, only six months after independence was declared. The integration of 
Palmach and Irgun into the IDF, as well as the dissolution of Lehi, allowed Ben-Gurion to weaken 
political competition. Moreover, integrating Palmach and Irgun into a single military structure in 
the IDF reduced factionalism in the military, especially during the conflict-prone post-
independence period, and ensured civilian control. Ben-Gurion suggested having a small and 
professional army in addition to a large conscription and reserve system, would allow Israel to 
better follow scientific and technological developments (Perlmutter, The Military, 261 
 
 Ben-Gurion’s Labor Party dominated Israeli politics until the 1970s. Mapai leaders of the 
Labor movement endorsed the Marxist-Leninist approach that all state institutions, as well as the 
military, should be under party control (Ben-Eliezer 2014). Military subordination to the civilian 
authority of the Party characterizes civil-military relation in single-party states (Ben-Eliezer’s 
1993; Perlmutter, 1969) as “the military appeared to the party leaders as a potential challenger that 
must be contained, manipulated and controlled at all times in order to prevent a serious threat to 
the party monopoly of power.” (Peri 1983, 47). For Perlmutter (Ibid 35-7) the officers of the IDF 
fit the “revolutionary” model, there was ideological commitment to the party doctrine. Moreover, 
being surrounded by hostile states and having to fight to achieve nationhood, the notion of the 
people’s army was reinforced. In a parliament debate in 1949, Ben-Gurion suggested having a 
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small and professional army in addition to a large conscription and reserve system, which should 
follow scientific and technological developments (Perlmutter 1969, 261). 
 
 The subjective civilian control model (cf. Huntington 1957) for civil-military relations 
during the Labor Party period in Israel seems to downplay two factors. While the Palmach, 
Haganah’s elite military force, may have demonstrated ideological commitment to the Labor Party, 
the IDF did not have a single institutional ideology, as the integration of the Irgun and the Lehi 
members did not require the adoption of the political ideology of the higher echelons and the ruling 
party. Instead, especially after the Six Days War, the army became a pool for recruiting leaders for 
all parties to the multi-party system (Peri 1983). Should party-army relations describe the civil-
military equilibrium in Israel, any major political shift, like the 1977 electoral victory mahapach 
(electoral upheaval) of the right-wing Likud party,8 should alter the nature of civil-military 
relations. The absence of a major change in the military’s influence in Israel after Labor lost power 
would indicate that party-army relations models do not describe civil-military relations in Israel. 
 
 6.2 Arab-Israeli Conflicts  
 The study of large-scale military confrontations between Israel and the surrounding Arab 
states remains a favorite approach by scholars to examine the role of the Israeli Defense Forces’ 
(IDF) in policy and decision-making in the country. Ben-Eliezer (1995)9 and Schiff (1999) argue 
that the 1967 Six-Day War showcases the influence of the military high command that not only 
                                                 
8 The (ha) Likud was founded by Irgun leader Menachem Begin in 1973 
9 Ben-Eliezer’s (1993) prior assessment contradicts this view. The author argued that the Labor party enforced 
civilian control of the military, comparing civil-military relations in Israel to party-army relations in single party 
states. 
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overrode civilian apprehension to go to war, but also determined the political goals that were to be 
achieved through strategic moves in the battlefield.  
 
 Any military designs on the battlefield were subordinate to political considerations. Despite 
senior officers’ pressure, in 1967 the civilian leadership did not go into war until the political 
context changed, and IDF plans of action and recommendations reflected wider national security 
goals. The Israeli government persisted in its efforts to exhaust diplomatic avenues with the U.S 
(Arye 2008, 39). It was not until the contingencies that Israeli military intelligence had warned 
about became a reality with Egypt’s military buildup in Sinai and the mutual Egypt-Jordan defense 
pact that the civilian leadership endorsed IDF’s recommendation for a military strike (Bregman 
2000, 48-50). This was also the case in 1956, when recommendations for large-scale military 
actions by senior IDF officers were postponed until Israel was able to secure Great Britain and 
France as allies (Dayan 
1955, 262; 1966, 13-15; 1976, 183; Bregman 2000, 37). 
 
 The 1982 Lebanon War features as another instance of the preponderance of the security 
mindset in Israeli politics (cf. Schulze 1998). Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Foreign 
Minister Yitzhak Shamir were former paramilitary leaders, while the CGS Rafael Eitan was an 
active participant in the decision-making process. However, it was Minister of Defense Ariel 
Sharon’s political agenda to change the leadership in Lebanon by placing the Maronite leader 
Bashir Jumayyil in power, that dictated the IDF’s moves in what was originally designed as a 48-
hour operation to clear the Palestinian bases out of Lebanon, even at the cost of a direct 
confrontation with the Syrian army that dictated the IDF’s moves in what was originally designed 
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as a 48-hour operation to clear the Palestinian bases out of Lebanon. Sharon was able to override 
both military and civilian apprehensions regarding the operation by downplaying the likelihood of 
a direct confrontation with the Syrian army and withholding plans for leadership change in 
Lebanon (Bregman 2000, 101-104). In 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak decided to pull the IDF 
out of Lebanon against the IDF’s recommendations (Ben-Meir 2006, 23). 
6.3 Security Threats 
 The analysis of the IDF’s influence in politics based upon the conflict and threat 
perceptions is problematic. The term ‘frontier security,’ which according to then Major-General 
Moshe Dayan did not apply to Israel, as its entire territory was a border (Dayan 1955, 250), held a 
different meaning after Israel’s victory in the Six Days War, as the country revolutionized its 
geopolitical situation by acquiring natural defensible borders. Israel gained strategic depth by 
adding the central mountain ridge cutting across the West Bank and advancing along the river 
Jordan and the Dead Sea. Despite Israel’s eventual military withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula 
over the 1970s, the Egyptian air threat to Israel from forward airfields in Sinai was successfully 
eliminated. Thus, the external political conditions that constituted a perceived existential external 
threat to Israel were significantly altered after 1967. 
 
 However, the acquisition of West Bank and Gaza, followed by the development of 
Israeli settlements in territories where Arabs were the majority population, expanded the role of 
the military into domestic security. The establishment of settlements in unpopulated areas 
constituted a major pillar of the Israel security doctrine as outlined in 1949. Settlement policy was 
derived from the belief that they would reinforce the state’s capacity to govern. The IDF 
maintained direct supervision of the construction, as the settlements were developed and fortified 
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as military strongholds (Ben-Eliezer 1995, 276-280). Therefore, the army already played an 
important role by carrying out non-military tasks in the areas of immigration, assimilation and 
settlement. The diversity introduced by the establishment of settlements in Arab populated areas 
prompted a reconsideration of the nature of threats to the Israeli state. 
 
 6.4 Occupied Territories 
 The categorization of the occupied territories produced many deadlocks in the peace 
negotiations, as the presence of settlements and Israeli citizen settlers is a subject of domestic 
political debate. As the territories are not within the internationally recognized borders of Israel, it 
is a foreign policy issue, thus part of the external environment that Israel has perceived as a threat 
to its existence. The Israeli doctrine of warfare formulated during the 1956 Sinai Campaign and 
the Six Day War was offensive, based on pre-emptive strike and transferring the war into enemy 
soil (Schiff 1999, 437). Theoretically, the presence of a population that until previously were 
considered external enemies within state boundaries posed internal threats to state security. In 
practice, the IDF assumed an executive role in administering the settlements and carrying out 
settlement policies, forming close relations with the settlers (Ben-Eliezer 1995, 272) and designing 
settlement plans that resulted in profound demographic changes in the occupied territories with 
implications for the civilian leadership’s policy-making (Kimmerling 2002, 1134). 
 
 The dismantling of settlements in Gaza in 2005 was authorized by Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon, one of the generals of the IDF who were “objects of sweeping admiration and 
emulation” (Ben-Eliezer 1998, 225) because of the military success 
in the Sinai front. As a politician he had advocated the territorial expansion of Israel 
58 
to prevent future partition of the state and during his tenures oversaw the increase of settlements 
in the West Bank and Gaza.  
 
 The naval blockade of Gaza was not lifted, and travel restrictions remained in place for the 
population. The government’s unilateral decision to disengage was met with fierce opposition 
within the right-wing ruling Likud party, ultimately forcing Sharon’s resignation from party 
leadership and early elections. The changing nature of security threats to Israel, do not permit an 
evaluation of civil-military relations by examining the army’s influence based on threat 
assessment; the new geographic setting and the acquisition of natural defensive lines in 1967 
allowed Israel to consolidate its hold of the Negev desert and thus eliminate the threat from a 
potential land bridge between Egypt and Jordan. On the other hand, the establishment of 
settlements in Gaza and the West Bank introduced quasi-internal threats to the Israeli states, as the 
status of the territories remained disputed.  
 
 The IDF enforced the Israeli settlement policy as part of its security doctrine, undertaking 
an active role constructing and fortifying Israeli settlements in areas where the majority of the 
population were Palestinians. In the West Bank and Gaza there is no separation of the civil from 
the military sphere, the occupied territories are in fact ruled by the Israeli army. However, the 
danger arising from the informal connections between the army and societal groups (cf. Ben-
Eliezer 1998), such as the settlers, did not materialize in the form a military coup; the IDF did not 
appear to consider the reversal of the settlement policy as a security threat or as an attack to its 
group interests. The source and intensity of threats to Israeli security have changed, however no 
major change in civil-military relations can be observed. 
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 6.5 The impact of the 1967 Six Days War and the 1982 Lebanon War on civil-
military relations 
 Israel’s first two decades was a critical time period during which the military’s role in 
decision making was shaped. The officers served under strong civilian control, but the IDF had 
maintained significant autonomy in security issues, allowing the military to have exceptional 
influence in the decision-making process on issues requiring the use of force. Israel could be 
described as a modern political system, where any decisions to go to war or negotiate peace are 
made by civilian authorities who consult the military professionals when necessary, but the it was 
IDF’s triumphs in the battlefield have solidified its image is a highly professional organization 
whose advice on related matters should be heeded by the government.  
 
 The Six Day War had been an important military victory, a critical juncture that had 
produced two developments. The first, as mentioned above was the acquisition of new territories 
West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, Sinai, and East Jerusalem, which fundamentally altered the 
security environment and became an important subject of political debates. The second was that 
these military victories changed the way the IDF participated in politics as the civilian leadership 
increasingly came to rely on expert advice. The appointment of Moshe Dayan, during the Six Days 
War, as the Defense Minister, set off a tradition whereby after military victory, the generals of this 
war would go on to hold important posts in the government, even become Prime Ministers. The 
combined effect of these two outcomes was that politicized and ambitious military generals, like 
Ariel Sharon, who held a particular ideology on the settlements, would join the ranks of or form a 
political party that would reflect this ideology and garner support from the Israel society more 
easily that civilian politicians (Ben-Eliezer 1998, 225).   
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 The entrance of retired generals into politics as a second career is a common phenomenon 
in Israeli political life, especially ever since the 1967 Six Days War. While politicians with military 
background enter politics after retirement in other countries as well, the unique feature about Israel 
is that IDF officers retire usually in their forties, which means they can pursue politics as a second 
career. Early retirement in Israel was established in the mid-1950s to prevent the aging of the 
officer corps and allow younger officers with high morale to join the army (Horowitz 1982, 86). 
These type of indirect interventions of the IDF high command behind-the-scenes has been accepted 
as a part of the political system.  
 
 Operational successes in the battlefield since 1948 continuing into the 1960s established 
the IDF as the national hero of the Israeli society, shielding its intervention in politics from 
criticism, at least until the relatively large loss of life sustained by the IDF in the 1982 Lebanon 
invasion. However, just as the 1956 and 1967 were significant in legitimizing the military’s 
indirect influence and participation in politics, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and Israel’s 
subsequent protracted engagement highlighted how Israeli society had also become a significant 
determinant in civil-military relations. False intelligence assessments in 1973 resulted in Israel’s 
eventual withdrawal from the Sinai over the next decade. The war in Lebanon seemed to reveal 
cracks within the society and the IDF, as the military and civilian disagreements over the purpose 
the stationing of troops in Southern Lebanon appear to shatter the of a domestic consensus over 
foreign policy decisions (Ben-Eliezer 2001, 153).  
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 The prestige of the IDF further declined during the Lebanon War of 1982, as especially the 
massacres in Sabra and Shatila raised criticisms against the government, particular Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon, one of the glorified generals of the Suez War and the Six Days War, who 
seemed so determined to see a regime change in Lebanon and drag the Syrians into war, that he 
lied to his government (Peri 1983, 118). The Israeli society has started to discuss “war of choice” 
and questioned the consequences of the Lebanon War of 1982. As a result, Sharon had to resign 
as Defense Minister, but he remained at the government as Minister of Portfolio (Bell 2005, 252). 
 
 Since the 1980s, probably also owing to the development of alternative areas such as 
industry for former officers to pursue a second careers, the number of the retired military officers 
entering politics has decreased (Lissak and Maman 1999, 230). However, there has been 
decreasing demand for retired officers due to public criticism of IDF’s acts in Lebanon and the 
settlements. The Agranat Commission was established after the 1973 Yom Kippur War and 
advised for constitutional changes regarding civil-military relations. Dayan resigned, although he 
was not found responsible (Peri 1983, 257). The report of the Winograd Commission about the 
Second Lebanon War of 2006 criticized not only the operational shortcomings, but also the 
strategic planning, the decision-making processes and the unclear role and responsibility 
definitions, emphasizing the inordinate influence of the Chief of Staff (Meir, 2008). Last but not 
least, the poor performance of the IDF during the Second Lebanon War dropped the recruitment 
rates even more, making the IDF dependent more on religious and settler conscripts, who would 
be less inclined to obey an evacuation order and assist in dismantling a settlement, should that be 
the command (Yagil 2011, 29). 
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7. Conclusion 
 One of the most prominent features of the Turkish and Israeli political systems has been 
the strong place of the militaries in politics. What is common for both Israel and Turkey is that 
despite having democratic systems, civilian control over the military is not consolidated. Both the 
Turkish and the Israel military have intervened indirectly in politics through exerting influence or 
pressure over the civilian leadership. The aim of this study has been to compare military 
interventions in Israel and Turkey. The reason has been to understand why the Turkish military 
has directly intervened in politics to force a change of the civilian government (1971 and 1997) or 
implement direct military rule in (1960 and 1980) and why the Israeli military hasn’t.  
 
 The single-party era in Turkey (1923-1946) was formative in establishing the role of the 
military as the protector of the state, but most importantly of the regime. The party created by 
Kemal Mustafa Atatürk, the Republican People's Party (CHP), was based on a coalition of military 
and civil bureaucrats, and also founded the Republic. During the single-party era, civil-military 
relations in the Turkish Republic were characterized by a cooperation between the civilian and 
military leadership, as key government posts were occupied by former military leaders. As most 
of the politicians in top leadership posts, like Ataturk were army men, they had close personal ties 
with the military leadership. The CHP used the military to consolidate control of the state and the 
military became the guardian of the state and the regime, developing a strong sense of corporate 
identity and entitlement to power. 
 
 The transition to a multi-party electoral system upset the partnership between the civilian 
and military leaderships. Coalition governments unsuccessfully attempted either to marginalize or 
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to coopt the military. Efforts to push the military away from political institutions forced the civilian 
and military leaderships into repeated clashes, with the military intervening to uphold the political 
order and reconsolidate its power. In order to have functioning democracies, powerful political 
participatory institutions are required, yet in Turkey political parties have been weak. Between the 
1960 and 1980 coups eighteen governments were formed because parties were unable to form 
strong coalition governments, increasing political and economic instability in the country. It was 
not until 2002, when the AKP was able to establish a strong government without any coalition 
partners, that the military’s role and ability to intervene were challenged. Civil-military relations 
in Turkey have witnessed dramatic changes since AKP’s second term in office, which put an end 
to direct military interventions and dramatically weakened indirect military interventions in 
politics. 
 Contrary to Turkey, the multi-party politics democratic system in Israel is not characterized 
by intense political competition between the military and the civilian leadership as institutions. 
Key positions in government system have often been held by former senior officers of the IDF, 
with candidates from the military staffing the party leadership across the political spectrum. The 
borders between the civilian and military echelons are not strictly delineated; military officers 
easily enter the political arena post-retirement, as they did during the state-building period when 
the paramilitary organizations were integrated into a professional army and political competition 
was channeled through the party system.  
 
 Unlike Turkey, the military and civilian leadership did not adhere to a single political 
ideology, nor did the military seek to impose any institutional ideology on the civilian leadership. 
The military instead imported ideologies developed in the civilian sphere, an indication of the 
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military’s subordination to the state and acceptance of the legitimacy of civilian authorities. During 
the Single-Party era in Turkey (1923-1946), the Kemalist coalition between military officers and 
state bureaucrats essentially banned opposition parties that challenged Kemalist ideology. The 
transition to a multi-party system and the ascendance of parties that sought to marginalize the 
Kemalists prompted military intervention to secure the military’s political role and uphold the 
founding principles of the state. During the Labor Party’s political hegemony in Israel, the 
competition between the ideologically diverse military underground organizations was transferred 
to the multi-party system. Political disputes between the civilian and military elites are settled 
through political institutions.  
 
 Modernization theory scholars like Halpern (1963) and Janowitz (1964) believed that 
militaries in developing countries are involved in nation-building and the modernization process, 
therefore they considered them progressive forces. In Turkey the military undertook projects 
mainly to educate and industrialize the society, yet as the TAF retained its institutional autonomy 
and political ideology, they did not require civilian allies to overthrow threats to the republic, 
leading to divergence between the civilian and military leadership. During the 1990s the military’s 
role further eroded, as political parties with parliamentary majority were able to legislate against 
the military’s legal and moral claims to guardianship status In Israel, the large reserve system and 
number of conscripts mean that the military has become a significant part of the society’s life, and 
that operational successes and failures will impact the perception of the army. While the military’s 
expertise in security issues is not publicly contested, the current Prime Minister and Defense 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the first PM with the least military experience but the most vocal 
about the military’s influence. 
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